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ABSTRACT  
The 25 January revolution has created a new reality in Egypt. It has made 
Egyptian citizens more eager than ever to participate in the political life and to 
exercise their long awaited right to elect their representatives and leaderships. 
It was therefore inevitable for Egyptians living abroad to demand their right to 
vote. The Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections (SJCE) accordingly 
approved a system for out-of-country voting that was implemented in the 
Parliamentary Elections 2011/2012. ‘Postal Voting’ was chosen for the 
process. The Committee's choice of the voting system was done in an 
exceptionally short period of time and under considerable pressure. It was 
therefore crucial to examine the system that has already been adopted and 
implemented. It was also vital to decide which of the four main external voting 
options (Postal – Personal – Proxy - Electronic), or which combination of 
them,  is the most suitable for the future Egyptian elections. The main 
objective of the research was to determine which option is the cheapest, which 
is the most secure and which is likely to lead to the highest turnout rates in 
out-of-country voting. A combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches was used in this study. Empirical analysis revealed a strong 
relationship between implementing postal voting and increasing turnout rates. 
Qualitative analysis suggested that e-voting is the cheapest voting method, 
while personal voting is the most secure. It was concluded that the most 
suitable out-of-country voting method for future Egyptian elections is the 
postal voting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. Research Topic  
 Many countries currently allow the option of out-of-country voting (OCV) to 
citizens living abroad. A need to implement such systems arose because of increased 
migration for numerous purposes and the rise in impermanent travel which deprived 
millions of citizens of their basic right to vote. When these new conditions were 
coupled with the growing awareness about political entitlements, citizens began to 
voice their desire to exercise their right to vote even when living abroad. Some 
governments acted decades ago to fulfill this plea by implementing OCV systems. 
Nonetheless, the decision to allow such an option to citizens has not always been a 
voluntary one. In some countries allowing OCV was offered after considerable 
pressure was exerted, either by the expatriates or the international community, on the 
decision makers of the country in question. Allowing citizens residing abroad to vote 
is particularly important in countries which have a significant proportion of their 
populations living abroad.  
 The 25 January revolution has created a new reality in Egypt. It has made 
Egyptian citizens more aware of their rights and more concerned about the public and 
political affairs of their country. They have become more eager than ever to 
participate in the political life and to exercise their long awaited right to elect their 
representatives and leaderships. It was therefore inevitable for Egyptians living 
abroad to demand their right to vote and insist on it. It is estimated that around 8 
million Egyptian citizens reside abroad and this emphasizes the importance of such an 
issue in the Egyptian context. Despite the fact that the desire of Egyptian expatriates 
to vote was disregarded by the decision makers in the months following the 
revolution, the ruling of the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court enabling 
Egyptian citizens living abroad to vote in October 2011 changed everything. The 
ruling however was issued a little over a month before the parliamentary elections 
were due to start. This posed a severe implementation challenge to the interim 
government in the previous parliamentary elections. It is therefore crucial to carefully 
examine all possible alternatives and options to establish a robust out-of-country 
voting system and this is what the research attempted to do. 
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 There are four main voting options for citizens living abroad (Ellis & Wall, 
2007). The first is ‘Personal Voting’, in which citizens go to diplomatic missions or 
specified polling places set up abroad to cast their votes (Ellis & Wall, 2007). The 
second is ‘Postal Voting’, in which citizens fill out the ballots at the place of residence 
and send them by ordinary mail either to the home country or to diplomatic missions 
(Ellis & Wall, 2007). The third is ‘Proxy Vote’, in which citizens residing abroad 
choose a proxy to cast their votes at a polling station in the home country or abroad in 
diplomatic missions (Ellis & Wall, 2007). The final option is ‘Electronic Means’, in 
which voters use the Internet, personal digital assistants or telephones to cast their 
votes (Ellis & Wall, 2007). ‘Postal Voting’ was chosen for the OCV system approved 
by the SJCE. Citizens were given the choice to either send their votes to the 
diplomatic missions through ordinary mail or to personally hand in their votes in 
closed envelops to the missions. 
B. Statement of the Problem 
 As with most countries going through transition, Egypt had to set up an 
external voting system from scratch without trained staff or relevant structures in 
place. Establishing a new external voting system in any country is usually a complex 
and challenging endeavor. To complicate matters further, the planning and 
mobilization of resources for implementation in Egypt was done in an exceptionally 
short period of time. This subjected all participants in the process to considerable 
pressure at a time when public sentiment was already running high. As a result, the 
OCV system that was adopted faced many problems and contained numerous 
drawbacks which were evident during all stages of casting and counting the votes. 
These shortcomings were reported by the different stakeholders in the process 
including voters, diplomats administering the external voting in Egyptian embassies 
abroad and diplomats in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting as liaisons 
between the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections (SJCE) and the Egyptian 
embassies abroad. 
 The central question that was answered by the study is which out-of-country 
voting option (or combination of options) is most suitable for future elections in 
Egypt? To answer this question, four subsidiary questions were answered. The first 
was what are the negative aspects of the OCV system devised by the SJCE for the 
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parliamentary elections in Egypt? The second was which out-of-country voting option 
(Personal / Postal / Proxy / Electronic) guarantees higher turnout by external voters 
based on cross-country data collected about OCV systems implemented by other 
countries? The third was which out-of-country voting option costs less to administer? 
And the fourth was which out-of-country voting option is more secure? When the 
most suitable alternative for OCV is chosen, a specific set of recommendations 
concerning it were proposed for all stages of the voting process starting from the 
registration and continuing to announcing the results. 
C. Conceptual Framework 
 Three aspects of the out-of-country voting methods implemented in other 
countries were examined to determine which option will be most suitable for Egyptian 
elections (Figure 1). The main objective was to show which option is the cheapest, 
which is the most secure and which guarantees the highest turnout levels in OCV. 
 
FIGURE 1- ASPECTS OF OCV 
 
 Clearly, the turnout rates in out-of-country elections are not only affected by 
the voting system/s used. Other significant factors can be examined to determine 
whether or not they can be considered determinants for the turnout rates. Based on the 
literature reviewed, these factors could include the political stability, civil liberties, 
literacy levels, human development and citizen migration characteristics (Figure 2). 
When analyzing available data about the turnout in OCV in different countries, these 
factors were taken into consideration to be able to draw results relevant to Egypt. 
Aspects of 
OCV Options 
Adminstration 
Cost 
Turnout Security 
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FIGURE 2 – POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF TURNOUT RATES 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. Background 
According to data in the Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook 
concerning the OCV systems implemented by the various countries around the world, 
the following conclusions can be made: 
1) Until 2007, 110 countries worldwide had implemented some form of OCV 
voting for citizens living abroad. Five other countries had introduced 
constitutional or legal provisions that make voting from abroad possible, but 
have not actually implemented the process. These countries are Angola, 
Bolivia, Greece, Nicaragua and Panama.  
2) Of the 110 countries, 27 implemented hybrid systems for out-of-country 
voting, while 83 applied single systems. The most used single system was the 
personal voting system (Table 1), while the most used hybrid systems were 
(personal + postal) and (personal + proxy) (Table 2). 
TABLE 1 – COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTING SIGLE VOTING SYSTEMS (SOURCE: THE 
INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK) 
Procedures No. of Cases Countries 
Personal voting 
only 
54 Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Moldova, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Peru, Pitcairn Islands, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Principe, Senegal, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen 
Postal voting only 25 Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, Falkland 
Islands, Fiji, Germany, Gibraltar, Guernsey, 
Ireland, Italy, Jersey, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Isle of Man, Marshall 
Islands, Mexico, Norway, Panama, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe 
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Proxy voting only 4 Mauritius, Nauru, Togo, Vanuatu 
 
TABLE 2 – COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTING HYBRID VOTING SYSTEMS (SOURCE: THE 
INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK) 
Mixed Voting Procedures No. of Cases Countries 
Personal + Postal 12 Cook Islands, Indonesia, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Micronesia, Palau, 
Philippines, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Thailand 
Personal + Proxy 7 Algeria, Benin, Chad, France, 
Gabon, Guinea, Mali 
Postal + Proxy 2 India, United Kingdom 
Personal + Postal + Proxy 2 Belgium, Sweden 
Other combinations 4 Australia (personal, postal, fax), 
Estonia (personal, postal, e-voting), 
Netherlands (postal, proxy, e-
voting), New Zealand (personal, 
postal, fax) 
 
3) Until 2007, no country used remote e-voting as the only available option for 
out-of-country voting. Only two countries used it as a part of a hybrid system 
which included two other voting options. Estonia implemented e-voting along 
with personal and postal voting, while the Netherlands implemented it along 
with postal and proxy voting.  
4) It can be concluded from the previous numbers that around 49 percent of 
countries that allow voting from abroad use personal voting, while 23 percent 
use postal voting and 11 percent use a combination of postal and personal. 
This means that 83 percent of countries allowing out-of-country voting use 
one of only three voting methods. Although the other voting options will be 
examined throughout this research, emphasis will be made on these three 
voting systems to determine the best option for the Egyptian context. 
5) Out-of-country voting is applied to different types of elections; mainly 
legislative, presidential and sub-national elections, in addition to referenda. 
The focus of this research will be on the presidential and legislative elections 
only. Until 2007, 31 countries allowed voting from abroad in legislative 
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elections only, 14 for presidential elections only, and 20 for both presidential 
and legislative elections (Table 3). 
6) Although a system has been devised for the OCV in the previous 
parliamentary elections in Egypt, it has not yet been determined in which types 
of elections will out-of-country voting be allowed. At the time of writing this 
research the Egyptian presidential election was due to start in days and it was 
announced that OCV would be allowed. It is still unclear however whether 
voting in local elections and on referenda will include OCV or not.  
TABLE 3 – TYPES OF ELECTIONS IN WHICH OCV IS APPLIED (SOURCE: THE INTERNATIONAL 
IDEA HANDBOOK) 
Type of Election No. of 
Cases 
Countries 
Legislative only 31 Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, 
Czech Republic, Fiji, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Iraq, 
Japan, Jersey, Laos, Lesotho, 
Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Netherlands, Oman, Pitcairn 
Islands, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, 
Zimbabwe 
Presidential only 14 Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Central African Republic, Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama, Tunisia, Venezuela 
Legislative + Presidential 20 Argentina, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, 
Croatia, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Indonesia, Israel, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, 
Romania, São Tomé and Principe, 
Senegal, Singapore, Syria 
Legislative + Presidential 
+ Other Types 
17 Algeria, Austria, Belarus, 
Colombia, Ireland, Moldova, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Togo, 
Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan 
B. Literature Review 
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1. General Aspects About OCV 
 It is clear from the literature written about OCV that this issue raises 
considerable controversy and disagreements. Differences of opinion regarding voting 
from abroad encompasses a wide range of related aspects; including who should vote, 
in which types of elections, whether it is a good idea to allow external voting or not, 
etc. Supporters of allowing voting for citizens living abroad believe that it is crucial 
since it helps maintain vital political ties with citizens who have left the country and 
who can be an important source of remittances which has become a significant source 
of income for some countries (Itzigsohn, 2000; Bauböck, 2005; Collyer & Vathi, 
2007). It is also argued that emigrants are politically important to the country of origin 
since they have the ability to organize influential lobbies that can support the political 
interests of the sending state (Levitt, 2001; Bauböck, 2005; Grace, 2007). The main 
idea behind such an approach is that by giving their citizens abroad more rights, 
governments can reasonably expect more from expatriates in return (Collyer & Vathi, 
2007).  
 On the other hand, opponents of allowing voting from abroad believe that 
citizens who live permanently - or for extended periods of time - abroad will not be 
affected by decisions made by legislatures and decision-makers, and should thus have 
no impact on elections results (Bauböck, 2005; Collyer & Vathi, 2007). It is argued 
that as a result of that, expatriates may be expected to vote less responsibly than those 
who are voting in-country (Grace, 2007). It is also contended by experts that 
expatriate voters may not have sufficient information about candidates and the 
political environment in their country of origin, and therefore are more likely to make 
the wrong choices (Collyer & Vathi, 2007). This is why many states that currently 
allow voting from abroad restrict that practice to voting in national elections only, 
since it is relatively easy to obtain information about them compared to local or 
municipal elections (Grace, 2007). 
 In terms of election administration, opponents of allowing expatriates to vote 
also indicate that out-of-country voting presents numerous challenges to election 
administrators. They claim that the costs associated with allowing citizens residing in 
scattered places abroad to vote places an “undue burden on those who remain” 
(Grace, 2007). It is concluded by experts that the cost per voter in out-of-country 
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elections is higher than that for in-country elections (Ellis & Wall, 2007). Another 
significant concern is the fact that maintaining the transparency and integrity of out-
of-country voting is a challenge since the electoral bodies do not have direct 
jurisdiction in other countries (Grace, 2007). Additionally, citizens and political 
parties will usually find it problematic to observe the voting process abroad (Grace, 
2007). Lowering the costs of out-of-country voting on citizens is seen as one of the 
major determinants that encourage citizen participation and can lead to increased 
turnout rates (Karp & Banducci, 2001). It is estimated, for example, that one of the 
major disadvantages of postal voting is its high costs on citizens in addition to 
possible slow postal services (Ellis & Wall, 2007).  
 Allowing voting to expatriates can be implemented in different forms. Citizens 
living abroad can be allowed to come back to their home country and vote in their 
district, they can vote from abroad for candidates in their home district, or they can 
vote from abroad for a ‘direct representative’ allowing them to have their own special 
representative in parliament (Collyer & Vathi, 2007). The most commonly 
implemented among the three systems is voting from abroad for candidates in the 
home electoral district (Collyer & Vathi, 2007). However, it is argued by experts that 
offering expatriates their own special representative in parliament is an effective way 
of mobilizing their votes (Bauböck, 2005). 
 One of the major issues discussed in the literature regarding out-of-country 
voting are the conditions specified by government that must be met by expatriates to 
allow them to register for voting (Grace, 2007). For example, the right to vote is 
sometimes limited to those who have certain identity cards such as voter identity 
cards which “de facto restricts access to voting rights for millions” (Lafleur, 2011). 
Other conditions may also include whether or not the voter keeps a fixed residence in 
the country of origin, how long the voter has been away from the state, in addition to 
the intent to return (Grace, 2007).  
2. Electronic Voting 
 Several aspects need to be considered regarding electronic voting as one of the 
four main options for out-of-country voting. The first is to what extent could the 
application of electronic voting leads to higher turnout rates. It is suggested by various 
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researchers and experts that this type of voting can have a positive effect on the 
turnout of specific segments of the population, particularly the younger generation 
which is increasingly familiar with computers and the internet (Hall & Alvarez, 2004; 
Thomas & Streib, 2003). It is also quite convenient for citizens of all ages to be able 
to vote in the comfort of their homes or offices (Epstein, 2011). Nonetheless, several 
researches confirm that e-voting will probably not encourage those people who 
originally do not vote to change their attitudes, it might however improve turnout 
among voters who sometimes vote and sometimes do not (Madise & Martens, 2006). 
It was found, for example, that in Switzerland internet voting had a significant impact 
on voters aged from 18 – 29 years (Different views of evoting – The Geneva Internet 
Voting System, 2005). This group of voters usually cast around 7-8 percent of all 
ballots, nonetheless when they had the option of e-voting they cast 10 percent of all 
ballots (Different views of evoting – The Geneva Internet Voting System, 2005). 
 On the other hand, the effect of this voting option on the turnout rates depends 
also on how secure citizens believe this method to be (Schaupp & Carter, 2005). 
Opponents of e-voting stipulate that security is a major obstacle facing the adoption of 
this technique in voting (Hall & Alvarez, 2004; Jefferson, Rubin, Simons, & Wagner, 
2004; Jukic & Vintar, 2006). Such a concern will of course also apply to the segment 
of the population which were expected to benefit the most from applying it, the 
younger computer savvy generations. Although there are many contradicting views 
regarding whether or not e-voting can be secured well-enough to avoid jeopardizing 
the integrity of elections, a considerable number of security experts do believe that 
"internet technology cannot guarantee the integrity of e-voting" (Lemos, 2004).  
 One of the countries which attempted to implement a wide-scale internet-
based electronic voting system for electors overseas was the USA (Ellis & Wall, 
2007). The SERVE (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment) was 
planned to be implemented for the external voting of American citizens abroad in the 
2004 elections but a report prepared by the Department of Defense stopped the project 
(Jefferson, Rubin, Simons, & Wagner, 2004). The report concluded that the project 
should be halted and nothing similar should be attempted until “both the Internet and 
the world's home computer infrastructure have been fundamentally redesigned, or 
some other unforeseen security breakthroughs appear” (Jefferson, Rubin, Simons, & 
Wagner, 2004; Cain, Mac Donald, & Murakami, 2008). 
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Another dimension of e-voting also discussed in the literature is that people's 
trust in their governments and e-voting providers has a direct effect on e-voting 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). It is highlighted that the citizens trust does not 
only depend on how secure they think the e-voting technologies are but also how 
much they trust the people entrusted with establishing it, namely "government 
officials, politicians, legislators, and systems developers that enable and implement e-
voting services" (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Experts have identified numerous security threats that could jeopardize the 
integrity of remote e-voting. Influence that can be exerted on voters to direct their 
votes through coercion, vote selling or vote soliciting are some of these threats 
(Rubin, 2000). Other major challenges include being able to successfully authenticate 
the identity of voters, shielding the system against hacker attacks either on the voting 
devices or the central election servers, as well as protecting the secrecy of the votes 
(McGaley M. , 2008). Additional difficulties also involve protecting the media 
between the voters’ devices and the central elections server from possible 
interceptions and manipulation of the data being transferred (Rubin, 2000; Madise & 
Martens, 2006).  
The cost of out-of-country voting is also another very important aspect to 
examine. Costs are significantly cut by computerizing the out-of-country voting 
system since staffing and training costs and the number of polling stations is 
decreased and this eventually decreases the cost per voter in the elections (Epstein, 
2011; Braun & Brändli, 2006). Nonetheless, additional costs are added when e-voting 
is chosen, including training people to operate the system and constantly monitoring 
and upgrading it (Epstein, 2011). It is concluded however that internet voting 
experiments so far have had very low turnout rates, and thus the cost per voter has 
been very high (Madise & Martens, 2006). 
3. Postal Voting 
 Similar to all types of out-of-country voting, postal voting has its pros and 
cons. Supporters of this voting method indicate that it significantly reduces the 
administrative work in diplomatic missions compared to voting in person, in addition 
to allowing potential voters in countries that may not want to allow elections on their 
territory to participate (Grace, 2007). It also reduces administration costs since there is 
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no need for setting up election polling stations, involving extra staff, or training 
existing staff (Grace, 2007; Harris, 1999; Gronke & Miller, 2007). It is also argued 
that postal voting presents a better chance for more accurate counting of ballots, in 
addition to giving voters the chance to make a more thoughtful electoral decision 
(Gronke & Miller, 2007). 
 On the other hand, several disadvantages for the postal voting are highlighted 
by experts. One of the most significant threats associated with this type of voting is 
fraud by third parties (Harris, 1999; Grace, 2007). Using postal voting means that 
there will be a period of time when the ballots will not be under the supervision of the 
election staff and can therefore be intercepted and tampered with (Grace, 2007). 
Another major concern is the loss of secrecy compared to voting in person since 
polling stations usually guarantee that votes are cast privately and without the 
influence of third parties (Harris, 1999). This is very difficult to guarantee in postal 
voting. 
 One of the major goals behind implementing postal voting is to increase 
turnout since it is anticipated that voters who were incapable of or reluctant to travel 
to a polling stations would use postal systems (Gronke & Miller, 2007). Nonetheless, 
there is significant controversy regarding whether or not shifting to postal voting 
actually increases turnout and it is therefore hard to make generalizations (Kousser & 
Mullin, 2007; Borisyuk, Rallings, & Thrasher, 2010). While some studies show that 
postal voting does increase voter turnout, it is concluded that this increase is usually 
relatively limited, and that in any case the increase should not be expected to be 
higher than 10 percent (Luechinger, Rosinger, & Stutzer, 2007; Gronke & Miller, 
2007). There is more agreement however on the notion that postal voting does 
encourage infrequent voters to participate rather than motivating new voters to take 
part in elections (Berinsky, 2005; Harris, 1999). It is also argued by others that 
switching to postal voting might have an effect on voter turnout rates only to the 
degree to which cost of voting is decreases (Solomon, 2009). It is therefore crucial to 
consider all other possible determinants while trying to identify the effect of shifting 
to postal voting compared to personal voting (Kousser & Mullin, 2007). 
 There are different subtypes of postal voting. In some countries, consulates 
and embassies abroad are not involved in the electoral process at all and votes are sent 
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directly to the relevant electoral bodies in the country of origin (Lafleur, 2011). In 
other cases, such as the case in the last parliamentary elections in Egypt, votes are 
sent to diplomatic missions in the country of residence and this is where the vote 
counting takes place and results are sent to the relevant electoral bodies in the sending 
state.   
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. Design Strategy and Framework 
 A combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches was used in this 
study to determine which OCV system is most suitable for Egypt. The study was 
divided into four main parts as follows: 
a. An analysis was performed for the OCV system devised by the SJCE for the 
parliamentary elections in Egypt. This was carried out to identify the points of 
weakness and challenges witnessed and reported by both the administrators of 
the process and the voters. It was important to keep these points in mind while 
making the recommendation at the end of the study regarding the best aspects 
that should be applied to the chosen OCV method. A qualitative approach was 
used in this area of the study. 
b. In the second part of the study, the turnout rate in the OCV of different 
countries was examined and analyzed and linked to the voting systems used, in 
addition to other possible determinants. This analysis was performed for 36 
elections. The aim was to try to find the system which guarantees the highest 
levels of turnout rates and to examine other possible determinants of turnout. A 
quantitative approach was used in this area of the study. 
c. In the third part of the study, available data about the cost of administrating 
OCV in other countries and their relationship with the voting system used was 
investigated. Literature was also reviewed regarding the cost of different voting 
methods. The aim was to identify the cheapest OCV system. A qualitative 
approach was used on this area of the study. 
d. In the fourth part of the study, the security aspect of the four voting systems was 
examined. The goal was to determine which of the four voting systems is more 
secure. The assumption in this part of the study was that the only factor 
affecting security is the voting system chosen. A qualitative approach was used 
on this area of the study. 
B. Data Collection 
Semi-structured interviews were used to tackle the first area of the study, 
which is the analysis of the system set by the SJCE for the parliamentary elections of 
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2011/2012. Interviews were conducted with three categories of interviewees. The first 
category of interviews was with diplomats who took part in administering the OCV 
process in the Egyptian embassies abroad. These interviews were performed with 
members of 11 different Egyptian embassies in various regions of the world which 
had high turnout rates in the parliamentary elections.  This was very helpful in 
knowing more about the process employed in addition to its weaknesses and the 
challenges they faced. Interviewing with this category were done over the internet. 
 The second category was with diplomats responsible for administering the out-
of-country voting inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and who were the 
main liaison between the Egyptian embassies abroad and the SJCE. They had 
considerable inside information that was crucial in understanding more about the 
positive and negative aspects of the process. Interview with this category was done 
face-to-face. 
The third category of interviews was with citizens living abroad who have 
taken part in the out-of-country voting in the parliamentary elections. Interviews 
within this category were with 18 citizens; 10 of which live in the capital cities and 
thus delivered their votes in person to the missions, and 8 of which live in other cities 
and so had to mail their ballots. Voters living in various countries in different regions 
were chosen for these interviews. Interviews with this category were done over the 
internet. 
Cross-country data concerning the turnout rates for elections in other countries 
as well as their cost were obtained for analysis from numerous sources including the 
relevant reports prepared by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), European Election Database, OSCE reports about elections, and 
the electoral commissions of a number of countries. 
Data concerning the cost and the turnout rates for the elections of some 
countries were also obtained by contacting the parliaments, chancelleries and the 
statistical office of these countries. 
To determine the political climate and the trust of citizens in government the 
Civil Liberties Index introduced by Freedom House in addition to the Democracy 
Index and Political Stability Index both introduced by Economist Intelligence Unit 
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were employed. The United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI) was used to 
examine data concerning the educational and poverty levels. Additionally, The World 
Bank’s literacy in adult population data was used. The World Bank’s net migration 
data and migrant remittance inflows data were used in the quantitative analysis. 
C. Limitations 
 The study was based on information gathered about out-of-country voting for 
elections that took place on or before 2007 due to the lack of comprehensive 
consolidated information about OCV after that. One of the major sources of 
information for this study was the International IDEA handbook which included 
available information about out-of-country voting for 214 countries on or before 
2007. This information was the basis for the study. Performing separate research 
about out-of-country voting for the same number of countries would have taken up 
too much time only to serve as the starting point for the research. 
 Initially there was an intention to obtain data regarding the cost of 
administering the out-of-country voting in other countries and to quantitatively 
analyze it. The aim was to reach empirical conclusions regarding which method of 
voting can be considered the cheapest. Nonetheless, it was difficult to obtain a 
sufficient amount of data that could allow for reaching reliable conclusions since costs 
of holding elections are usually calculated as a whole including in-country and out-of-
country voting together. This aspect of the study was therefore analyzed qualitatively 
based on the literature written about this aspect of external voting and on some data 
obtained from the chancelleries and statistical offices of some countries. 
 The turnout rates studied in this research represented the number of external 
voters who voted from abroad as a percentage of the number of electors who 
registered to vote from abroad. Although this aspect is crucial to understanding how 
citizen participation in the external elections can be enhanced, it failed to look at how 
to encourage the increase in the number of citizens registering to take part in the 
elections. This would have been another vital facet to take into consideration; 
however, it would have been considerably difficult to look into this aspect since there 
is no sufficient data about the number of registered voters as a percentage of the 
number of citizens present in a given country and eligible to vote. Also, it would have 
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been hard to perform a comparative study about this because the conditions applied 
by governments to determine who is eligible to register for voting are too diverse and 
numerous. Therefore it would have been very difficult to account for the diverse 
variables affecting such a number. 
 Data about turnout rates for OCV in each host country separately was no 
available except for the Egyptian elections. Having this data would have allowed for 
analyzing why voter turnout rates are higher in some host countries compared to 
others even though all citizens come originally from the same country. It would have 
made it possible to draw conclusions concerning the effect of conditions in the host 
countries on the voting patterns of the expatriates. 
  
18 
 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OCV Process Design and Registration Phase 
Interviews with knowledgeable MFA officials identified the following main aspects 
of the process design and registration phase:  
1) The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been studying the comparative 
experiences of the other countries concerning out-of-country voting since 
March 2011, and was keen on disseminating these studies to the relevant 
authorities even before the establishment of the SJCE in July 2011.  
2) MFA in cooperation with the IDSC (Information and Decision Support Centre 
affiliated to the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers) and the Ministry of State for 
Administrative Development drafted a modality for voting by mail. 
Immediately after the ruling of the administrative court to enable Egyptians 
abroad to vote the MFA conveyed to the SJCE a clear preference to adopt the 
mail voting option due to political, security, and logistical reasons. The SJCE 
was also informed that the MFA had approved the design developed by IDSC 
and MSAD.  
3) In due course, the SJCE approved the mail voting system to be used for the 
out-of-country elections. The main contribution of the SJCE in designing the 
process was deciding on the code of conduct that guarantees the legality of the 
process and securing it against appeals against election results based on the 
process. 
4) The registration process for Egyptian citizens abroad consisted of the 
following steps: 
i. A decision dated 7 November 2011 was issued by the SJCE to call 
upon Egyptian citizens living abroad to register for voting through the 
SJCE website during the period from 10 through 19 November 2011. 
ii. An announcement containing detailed information about how and 
when to register was put up inside and outside the embassy premises to 
inform Egyptian voters. 
iii. Egyptian embassies were instructed to offer help to voters unable to 
register on their own throughout the period of registration from 9 am 
till 8 pm including weekends. 
19 
 
iv. Registration was only possible for citizens who had a valid Egyptian 
national ID issued before 27 September 2011.  
v. When registration was completed, a registration number was issued 
and given to the voter for future use during the elections process. 
vi. When the registration process was completed, each embassy was asked 
to secure a reasonable number of ballot boxes suitable for the number 
of registered voters in the country of accreditation.  
vii. The electoral district for each voter was specified according to the 
citizen’s address in Egypt as detailed by the national ID. No seats were 
allocated to deputies representing Egyptian citizens abroad. 
B. Election Process for OCV 
Interviews with knowledgeable MFA officials clarified that the OCV process 
implemented during the previous parliamentary elections was as follows:  
1) The out-of-country voting was to be held in three phases, each having a 
second round for the runoffs, similar to what was applied in the in-country 
voting. Each phase included holding elections in 9 governorates. The first 
phase included Cairo, Fayoum, Port Said, Damietta, Alexandria, Kafr El 
Sheikh, Asyout, Luxor and Red Sea. The second phase included Giza, Bani 
Sweif, Al Monofeya, Al Sharkeya, Al Ismailia, Suez, Al Behera, Souhag and 
Aswan. The third phase included Al Menya, Al Kalyoubeya, Al Gharbeya, Al 
Dakahleya, North Sinai, South Sinai, Matrouh, Kena and New Valley. 
5) The voting process for Egyptian citizens abroad consisted of the following 
steps: 
i. A decision dated 21 November 2011 was issued by the SJCE outlining 
the out-of-country voting method to be employed for the parliamentary 
elections. Postal voting was identified as the only voting method 
accepted for the out-of-country voting.  
ii. Although envelopes could be delivered to the embassies in person, a 
comprehensive personal voting system was not implemented. Citizen 
delivered the ballots to the embassies in closed envelopes, which were 
to be handled in the same manner as the ballots sent by mail. 
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iii. It was decided for the first phase that only the Egyptian embassies 
abroad – not consulates general – would receive the ballots. However, 
starting from the second phase, it was decided that consulates in seven 
countries which have large numbers of Egyptian voters would receive 
the ballots in addition to the embassies. These countries were Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Canada, United States, Italy 
and France. 
iv. Voters were asked to print their ballots online from the SJCE website 
using their registration numbers and national ID numbers. The ballots 
already corresponded to the voter’s electoral district as identified by 
the registration number. The voter was asked to print all pages of the 
ballot, fill in the choices and put all pages of the ballots in an envelope 
that does not contain the name or address of the voter. Voters were 
then asked to write their electoral district on the back of the envelope. 
v. A statement of voting from abroad was also to be printed from the 
SJCE website. The voter was asked to fill in his/her registration 
number on the statement and sign it. They were also asked to provide 
copies of documents proving their residence in the country in which 
they chose to vote. These documents included a residence permit, 
driver’s license or valid student ID. Accordingly, citizens on short 
visits or stays in foreign countries were not allowed to vote. 
vi. Voters were then asked to place the statement of voting from abroad 
and the residence document/s in another envelop along with the other 
closed envelop which contained the ballots. The envelope with all 
requested papers was then to be mailed to the embassy or handed in 
personally. 
vii. For the first phase of the elections the ballots were to be available 
online for printing by voters on the SJCE website on 23 November 
2011 and the deadline for receiving the envelopes in the embassies was 
9 am on 26 November 2011. This left voters with only 3 days to print, 
fill out and mail the ballots, including time for transit within the 
country’s postal system.  
6) Administrative and organizational procedures carried out inside embassies 
regarding the voting process were as follows: 
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i. After envelopes arrived at the embassies, staff did not open them until 
the deadline on 9 am on 26 November 2011. On that day, they opened 
all outer envelops, took out the statement of voting filled out by voters, 
and checked the voters’ information against the voter lists they had 
received from the SJCE containing the names of the eligible voters 
who registered through the website. 
ii. The inner envelope was then put inside the ballot boxes inside the 
embassy and the box was sealed. According to the instructions, all 
envelopes were to be put inside the same ballot boxes without 
categorizing them according to the electoral districts. This was to be 
finished by the end of the 26 November 2011.  
iii. A committee for monitoring the counting of votes was formed, 
consisting of the relevant members in the embassy staff and a number 
of representatives of the Egyptian communities abroad as well as 
representatives of the candidates and parties. 
iv. On 27 November 2011 – one day before voting was scheduled to start 
in Egypt for the same phase – the ballots boxes were opened in the 
presence of the monitoring committee.  
v. The envelopes were opened and stamped by the embassy seal and 
categorized by electoral districts. Correct votes were identified 
according to the conditions specified by the SJCE. Votes were then 
counted and registered in detail in SJCE approved forms.  
vi. The results were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 9 am on 28 
November 2011. MFA then added up the results received from all over 
the world and forwarded these to the SJCE. The original printed ballots 
were shipped in special diplomatic pouches to the MFA to be delivered 
to the SJCE. 
vii. On 25 November 2011, it was decided that all deadlines mentioned 
above would be postponed for a day after a decision was made that 
voting in-country would be prolonged for a day.  
7) The same procedures mentioned above were repeated in the runoffs and the 
second and third phases. 
8) The approximate cost of implementing the out-of-country voting for around 
218,000 voters was one million Egyptian pounds, somewhat less than a dollar 
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per vote. Administration costs were paid by the MFA, and at the time of 
writing this research, a process was underway to receive a refund from the 
SJCE as agreed before the beginning of the elections.  
C. Turnout Data in the Egyptian Elections 
 According to the available data, the total number of registered voters for all 
three phases combined was approximately 368,000 citizens (Appendix A). It can be 
noted that this number is very limited if compared to the total number of Egyptians 
living abroad. Official numbers indicate that around 2.7 million Egyptians live 
abroad, while unofficial estimates indicate that the number could be as high as 8 
million. The official number implies that only 13.6 percent of Egyptians living abroad 
registered to vote in the parliamentary elections, while the unofficial number suggests 
that only 4.6 percent registered to vote. Either way, the number of registered 
Egyptians was significantly low. 
 Of the 368,000 Egyptians who registered to vote, around 142,655 registered in 
Saudi Arabia, 73,029 in Kuwait, 36,812 in the United Arab Emirates, 21,722 in Qatar, 
20,604 in the United States and 9,236 in Canada. This clearly indicates that most 
Egyptians who registered to vote in the elections were those in the gulf countries, 
where the largest Egyptian communities reside (Figure 3). 
23 
 
 
FIGURE 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF REGISTERED EGYPTIAN VOTERS (SOURCE: MFA) 
 Around 218,000 voters participated in the out-of-country voting in the 
parliamentary elections. The turnout rate for all phases and rounds of the elections 
was 59.3 percent of those registered. Of the 218,000 Egyptian who voted, 87,182 
voted in Saudi Arabia, 50,718 in Kuwait, 18,248 in the United Arab Emirates, 15,390 
in Qatar, 11,524 in the United States, and 5415 in Canada (Figure 4). It is evident 
therefore that the overwhelming majority of voters were again those resident in the 
gulf states. 
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FIGURE 4 - DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL EGYPTIAN VOTERS (SOURCE: MFA) 
 Although it would have been expected that allowing consulates to receive 
ballots starting from the second phase would increase turnout rates in the second and 
third phases compared to the first phase, this was not the case. In most of the seven 
countries turnout rates decreased steadily from one phase to another (Table 4).  
TABLE 4 – COMPARISON AMONG TURNOUT RATES (% OF ACTUAL VS. REGISTERED VOTERS) IN 
2011 ELECTION PHASES (SOURCE: MFA) 
Country Turnout (%) 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Saudi Arabia 55.1 67.3 63.2 
United Arab Emirates 66.6 34.6 26.6 
Canada 60.5 58.4 33.1 
United States 65.5 44.3 10.5 
Italy 89 30.2 7.4 
 The turnout rates for out-of-country voters in the three phases of the election 
are shown below in figures 5-7 for countries which contain the largest number of 
Egyptian voters: 
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FIGURE 5 - SOURCE: MFA 
 
FIGURE 6 - SOURCE: MFA 
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FIGURE 7 - SOURCE: MFA 
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D. Problems and Comments Reported by Administrators 
1) The postal voting was viewed by the MFA officials to be the best option for 
conducting out-of-country voting for the following reasons: 
i. The political infeasibility associated with the fact that a significant number of 
host countries have reservations regarding allowing a huge number of 
expatriate Egyptians to assemble to vote personally made in-person voting 
problematic because the needed licenses might not have been granted due to 
political and security reasons. 
ii. The huge number of Egyptians in some countries, which is not matched by the 
needed personnel and logistical capacities of the diplomatic missions, made it 
hard to implement personal voting.  
iii. The presence of huge Egyptian communities in countries with vast 
geographical size would have imposed heavy transport costs on voters under 
an in-person voting system; thus, postal voting was seen by officials as 
optimal to overcome this aspect. 
iv. In terms of security, postal voting was a much more secure option compared to 
e-voting which is commonly renounced by almost all countries. 
2) The major problems faced by administrators in the process were: 
i. Instructions for embassy staff regarding the voting process were received only 
days before the start of the actual voting period. Therefore, they had 
insufficient time to direct questions about any ambiguities to the SJCE and to 
fully comprehend their role and responsibilities. For example, the voting 
method chosen for OCV and the relevant steps to be followed by both voters 
and administrators were announced only 2 days before the printing of ballots 
from the SJCE website was due to start. This also presumable caused problems 
on the voters’ side, discussed below. 
ii. No training of any kind was provided to diplomats administering the elections 
in the embassies which forced them to improvise in numerous situations. 
iii. Instructions coming from the SJCE did not take into consideration the 
specificities of counting votes in embassies vis-à-vis counting votes in 
elections centers inside Egypt. Inside Egypt elections centers were assigned to 
count the votes for their relevant specific electoral district only. On the other 
hand, in embassies votes were cast by voters from all electoral districts of 
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Egypt and thus counting them was quite a different process if compared to the 
in-country process. Instructions arriving to embassies did not include articles 
on how this was to be handled. 
iv. There were no reliable continuous channels of communications between 
embassies and Egyptian citizens in the countries in which they are located. 
This limited the ability of embassies to inform Egyptian voters about any 
updates or urgent matters related to the voting procedures. Embassies had to 
depend on citizens’ visiting the website of the SJCE periodically for updates 
or contacting the relevant embassy for information, which was not necessarily 
effective. 
v. Directives issued by the SJCE regarding the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens and candidate representatives who took part in monitoring the process 
of opening envelopes and counting the votes were imprecise and vague. The 
instructions for example stated that representatives should not be informed 
about the results of the elections in the embassy to avoid untimely disclosure 
of results. In practices this was hard to apply since it was very easy for them to 
figure out the results by just monitoring the process. 
vi. In some cases, when instructions from SJCE about some aspects of the voting 
process were ambiguous, judgment calls had to be made by the head of the 
diplomatic mission on how to handle such issues. Therefore, some aspects 
were handled differently in different embassies, especially when there was 
insufficient time to seek clarifications from the SJCE. This caused significant 
stress to heads of missions and diplomats involved since there were worries 
that such judgment calls could be used later on as bases for appeals against 
election results in their embassies. 
vii. Deadlines for receiving the envelopes in the embassies, and accordingly for 
every other step in process, were modified by the SJCE numerous times which 
caused significant confusion for embassies and for the voters. Since there were 
no reliable continuous channels of communications between embassies and 
Egyptian citizens it was difficult to propagate this information promptly to 
voters. 
viii. The number of diplomats and administrative staff in the embassies were very 
few compared to the number of voters, especially in some of the gulf 
countries, which made administering the elections very challenging.  
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ix. Not enough time was given to diplomatic missions to engage with the 
expatriate communities to educate them about the precise rules and regulations 
of the voting process to reduce the number of void votes. 
3) Administrators underlined that one of the potential loopholes in the system 
that could jeopardize the integrity of the votes is the fact that postal voting 
leaves ample room for collective voting. One person or entity can fill out the 
ballots on behalf of a group of voters after financially or psychologically 
coercing them. This possibility coupled with the fact that democratic practices 
and concepts are still fairly new to a large portion of Egyptian voters means 
that collective voting was an imminent threat to the integrity of the votes. 
Diplomats administering the voting process in some embassies noted that 
some of the ballots mailed together were completed in the same handwriting 
and with the same pen. These votes were considered valid votes since no clear 
stipulation was included in the regulations to suggest otherwise. 
4) Most respondents believe that applying e-voting for the out-of-country 
elections would be the best option to guarantee an efficient voting process, 
despite the security concerns. 
E. Problems and Comments Reported by Voters 
1) The main problems reported by voters based on the interviews carried out with 
them were as follows: 
i. Technical problems when they tried to access the SJCE website in the 
registration phase. Millions of Egyptian citizens all around the world tried to 
access the website throughout the course of only a few days to register in order 
to be eligible for voting. The website was not designed to withstand such 
pressure and so it failed to operate properly for hours at a time. 
ii. Some Egyptian citizens complained that they did not know how to use the 
internet and therefore could not register. Egyptian embassy staff offered to help 
Egyptian citizens register either by answering their questions over the phone or 
by setting up computers in the embassies and receiving citizens specifically for 
this purpose. 
iii. In some countries it was hard for citizens to depend on the flawed national 
postal services for the timely delivery of the envelopes containing the votes to 
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the embassies. This forced them to personally visit the embassy to hand in their 
envelopes. Some of them reside outside the capital cities and thus had to travel 
long distances to deliver the votes. In numerous instances, a voter was entrusted 
with travelling to the capital city where the embassy is located to deliver the 
ballots of dozens of voters. 
iv. The period of time specified for receiving the envelopes in embassies was quite 
short and in some countries it coincided with weekends and so postal services 
were not working. The time allocated for printing out the ballots, filling them 
out and sending them to the diplomatic missions was 3-4 days per round. Many 
envelopes therefore arrived to the embassies after the deadline. In other cases 
citizens had to use express postal services to guarantee their votes arrived on 
time and so had to pay relatively significant sums of money. Some voters 
reportedly paid up to $50 to use express postal services. 
v. A large number of voters had problems in printing the ballots from the SJCE 
website. In some cases the website did not work properly because of the 
overload and so they had to try several times before they could successfully 
print it. Some were unable to print in and send it on time because of these 
technical problems. In other instances, the printed ballots were incorrect 
because they did not correspond to the voters’ electoral district. 
vi. A significant number of voters reported that the voting process starting from 
registration till sending out the ballots in envelopes as instructed by the SJCE 
were too complicated. Significant confusion was caused for example by the 
instructions that two envelops have to be used; one containing the ballot and one 
containing a form identifying the electoral district of the voter. This caused a 
considerable number of voters to make mistakes which nullified their votes, and 
discouraged others from voting altogether. 
vii. Most voters mentioned that registration should not have been allowed only for 
those with national IDs and that passports would have been enough especially 
that most second generation Egyptians living abroad do not have national IDs. 
viii. The lack of detailed widespread awareness campaigns among Egyptian 
expatriates about how to fill out the ballots and how to send in the votes caused 
large numbers of votes to be nullified. Directives were not clear enough and 
were not spread enough. 
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ix. The need to present a document proving legal residence in the country 
(residence permit, driver’s license, student ID …etc.) to have a valid vote 
deprived illegal immigrants from participation. 
2) Most interviewed voters stated their belief that applying remote e-voting would 
have been the best option to guarantee higher turnout rates. More than half the 
respondents mentioned that they felt anxious that their vote might not arrive on 
time and some even feared that they might not reach the embassy at all. 
3) Approximately 40 percent of citizens mentioned that a hybrid system of postal and 
personal voting would have increased turnout rates especially in countries where a 
large number of Egyptian citizens are illiterate. This would have made it easier for 
them to register and vote even if they did not know how to read and write, 
mirroring the in-country voting system. 
4) Although most interviewed voters were generally satisfied with their first OCV 
experience, they all believe that a lot still needs to be done to make it a successful 
experience. 
F. Comparative Cross-country Data Analysis 
 A multiple linear regression model was adopted to determine whether or not 
the turnout rate is affected by the implemented voting method and to explore possible 
determinants of the turnout rate. The model used relevant cross-country data resulting 
from elections throughout the years from 2000 to 2011. Turnout rates in 36 elections 
were obtained and analyzed through the model. Postal voting was used in 7 of the 
elections, personal voting was used in 20, and hybrid (postal + personal) was used in 
9.  
 Available data about the turnout in out-of-country elections were not enough 
to examine the turnout rates when other election methods (proxy and e-voting) or 
other hybrid systems are implemented. This can be attributed to the fact that those 
studied are the three most used systems for out-of-country voting as shown before 
(section 2.1). Around 49 percent of countries that allow voting from abroad use 
personal voting, while 23 percent use postal voting and 11 percent use a combination 
of postal and personal, for a total of 83 percent of the 110 countries for which data 
was available.  
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 Independent variables used in the analysis can be divided into two main 
categories. The first is the set of determinants associated with the political climate and 
the population inside the countries of origin which are the democracy index and the 
percentage of rural population. The other set of determinants are those directly related 
to expatriates such as the number of immigrants and the remittances they send back to 
the country of origin, which might indicate the degree of their connection with their 
country of origin.  
 Results of the dataset assembled from these variables was analyzed using the 
following model: 
                     
                                                                 
TABLE 5 - POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS FOR TURNOUT 
 Independent Variables 
   Postal Voting [1: Postal, 0: Personal or Hybrid(Personal + Postal)] 
   Personal Voting [1: Personal, 0: Hybrid(Personal + Postal) or Postal] 
   Net Migration [the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants] 
   Remittances [in gross dollars] 
   Democracy Index 
 
 When the linear regression and correlation were run the results in tables 6 and 
7 were shown: 
TABLE 6 SIGNIFICANCE OF DETERMINANTS OF TURNOUT 
Independent Variable Coefficients t-value p-value 
Postal Voting 0.524 4.282 0.000 
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Personal Voting 0.285 2.847 0.008 
Migration 3.075E-008 0.688 0.497 
Rural Population (% of total 
population) 
0.002 0.723 0.476 
Democracy Index 0.003 0.072 0.943 
R Square: 0.469  
F Value: 5.12  
 
 
TABLE 7 - PEARSON CORRELATIONS 
 Turnout 
Rate 
Postal 
Voting 
Personal 
Voting 
Migration Rural 
Population 
Democracy 
Index 
Turnout  
Rate 
1      
Postal  
Voting 
.475 1     
.003      
Personal 
Voting 
-.188 -.549 1    
.272 .001     
Migration -.262 .050 -.056 1   
.122 .772 .744    
Rural 
Population 
-.033 -.075 .259 -.142 1  
.850 .663 .127 .409   
Democracy 
Index 
-.217 -.013 -.300 .398 -.641 1 
.203 .941 .076 .016 .000  
 
 The model yielded an    at 47 percent which indicates an appropriate model 
fit. The coefficients for postal and personal voting are significant at 5 percent level. 
Results suggest that the turnout rate when using postal voting would be around 52.4 
percent and would be around 28.5 percent when personal voting is used. The results 
are statistically significant. It can therefore be concluded that postal voting increases 
turnout rates in OCV. 
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 The results also suggested that all other independent variables related to 
circumstances inside Egypt (democracy index - percentage of rural population) are 
statistically insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that expatriates live in 
other countries with different characteristics and conditions than their home country 
and therefore such variables associated with the country of origin are not relevant to 
their voting patterns. Results also suggested that the number of migrants leaving a 
country doesn’t significantly affect that turnout rate in OCV. 
 Prior studies have even shown that there is no significant statistical correlation 
between internal characteristics such as a country's literacy rate, for example, and its 
voter turnout rate in the in-country elections (What affects turnout?). If this has been 
proven for in-country elections, it is safe to conclude that it can be applied for similar 
characteristics in out-of-country voting. 
 The correlation performed between the variables (table 7) shows a slight 
positive correlation between the postal voting and turnout rate (r= 0.475). The results 
also show a slight negative correlation between postal and personal voting (r= -0.549). 
Finally, there is also a slight negative correlation between the democracy index and 
the percentage of rural population in a given country (r= -0.641). 
 It is important to note however that in some countries, turnout in OCV has 
decreased steadily over the years. This could indicate that when the novelty of OCV 
wears off, turnout rates could decrease. In the case of Portugal for example, evidence 
shows that the turnout rates in the out-of-country voting in legislative elections have 
been falling almost steadily since 1976 (Ellis & Wall, 2007). It has fallen from 86.7 
percent in 1976 to 25.2 percent in 2005 (Table 8).  
TABLE 8 – OVERSEAS TURNOUT IN PORTUGESE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (SOURCE: IDEA) 
Election Year Turnout (%) 
1976 86.7 
1979 66.8 
1980 61.6 
1983 45.3 
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1985 30.1 
1987 26.5 
1991 32.6 
1995 23.5 
1999 23.8 
2002 24.4 
2005 25.2 
 
 It can be concluded that it is difficult to identify any determinants of the 
turnout rate other than the voting method used. Turnout, for example, might be 
influenced by specific conditions or incidences that take place inside or outside the 
country on election day/s, which might be hard to examine statistically. Such 
conditions could for example include having a close election race or certain 
conditions in host countries. This could be a rich area for future study. 
G. OCV Cost and Security Analysis 
 Concerning the cost of administering e-voting, the information received from 
the Elections Department in the Chancellery of the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) 
confirmed the conclusions drawn from the literature. As mentioned earlier in the 
literature review (section 2.2), during the early stages of applying e-voting additional 
costs will have to be borne, but costs are significantly cut in later stages because the 
staffing and training costs of personnel need not be repeated and the number of 
polling stations can be decreased and this naturally decreases the cost. Data received 
about administering out-of-country voting for the Riigikogu elections in Estonia in 
2007 indicated that 3251 Estonians voted from abroad in these elections and the cost 
of administering the elections per voter was calculated to be 11.4 Euros, far above the 
estimated cost in Egypt. In these elections Estonia implemented a hybrid system of 
out-of-country voting which included postal, personal and e-voting. The Chancellery 
reported that the cost for e-voting on the other hand per voter in these same elections 
was only 1.7 Euros. Therefore, applying e-voting instead of postal and personal 
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voting significantly reduced the costs of administering the out-of-country voting in 
Estonia.  
In Switzerland the Federal Chancellery has carried out several pilot trials since 
2003 to assess the feasibility of remote e-voting (Braun & Brändli, 2006). It was 
estimated based on data gathered from the implementation of these pilot projects that 
the financial cost for developing and operating an e-voting system for elections and 
referenda can amount to 15 million Swiss francs (approximately 15.8 million US 
dollars) (Braun & Brändli, 2006). This sum includes operation and maintenance costs 
for ten years in addition to the cost of hiring staff and service costs (Braun & Brändli, 
2006). If it is assumed that around 1 million voters will use the system, the cost per 
vote would be less than half a Swiss franc and would therefore be more cost-effective 
than postal voting (Braun & Brändli, 2006). 
 In Egypt, however, a significant portion of the population would have 
difficulty using the internet to vote if it were selected as the only voting method 
available for external voters. The elderly, illiterate and citizens lacking computer 
skills would find it inconvenient to use internet voting and therefore it can be 
expected that a considerable percentage of them might choose not to vote. Knowing 
this, decision makers in Egypt would not be able to implement e-voting as the only 
voting method since it would deprive a large fraction of expatriates of their right to 
vote. They will, therefore, find it inevitable to provide traditional voting facilities to 
those who do not have internet access or do not feel comfortable handling e-voting. 
Traditional voting methods can in this case be implemented alongside e-voting or 
without it. Thus, viewing e-voting as the cheapest voting method to administer out-of-
country voting is not feasible since it cannot be applied on its own.  
 It has also become clear from the literature written on the security aspect of 
applying e-voting (section 2.2) that although a few countries have attempted to 
implement e-voting as an option for out-of-country voting, no country has resorted to 
implementing e-voting for external voting on a full-scale basis or as the only 
alternative for external voting. This has been the result of numerous studies that have 
concluded that remote e-voting is not a sufficiently secure method of voting to date. 
So far, although numerous countries have been applying e-voting in in-country 
voting, very few countries allow external voters to remotely cast their votes 
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electronically (Ellis & Wall, 2007). Until 2007 only Estonia and the Netherlands 
applied hybrid systems for external voting which included e-voting along with other 
voting alternatives such as personal and postal voting (Ellis & Wall, 2007). Therefore, 
until 2007, remote e-voting had not been implemented by any country as the sole 
means of voting from abroad.  
  
38 
 
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 It can be concluded from the study that postal voting is the second cheapest 
out-of-country voting method to administer, following e-voting. It also provides for 
an extensive reach, since citizens in all cities can use it to send their votes to 
diplomatic missions instead of having to go all the way to the capital cities where 
Egyptian embassies are located. Therefore it has the potential to lead to significantly 
higher turnout rates compared to other out-of-country voting methods.  
 The transparency of the postal voting process cannot be guaranteed since 
citizens do not get the chance to actually witness their ballots being secured inside the 
ballot boxes as in personal voting. The integrity of the votes is also hard to ensure 
since undue pressure can be exerted on voters away from the oversight of government 
representatives. Possible influences affecting voters can include coercion, selling or 
soliciting votes. It should be noted that this can also happen in-country, as long as it is 
implemented away from the polling places. 
 Although personal voting in diplomatic missions guarantees the highest level 
of transparency of the voting process and the maximum amount of vote integrity, it is 
an expensive endeavor with limited outreach. It is costly since extra expenses need to 
be added for aspects such as securing the voting premises, renting the voting sites 
where needed and employing additional staff for election administration. In countries 
such as Saudi Arabia where it is estimated that 1.5 million Egyptians live, renting 
sites for voting would have been required and thus quite costly. In any case, the 
turnout rates for personal voting are not expected to be as high as those for postal 
voting since a significant number of eligible voters live in cities other than those 
where diplomatic missions exist and not all other locations could be covered even if 
renting facilities was undertaken.  
 It has been proven that remote e-voting is the cheapest method to employ in 
out-of-country voting over the long run. Even though the initial cost of implementing 
e-voting is significantly higher than other traditional methods, it can save considerable 
amounts of administration costs in the long run. This type of voting also guarantees 
the best availability and outreach among specific segments of Egyptian citizens living 
abroad. It is accessible worldwide but it can be anticipated that a significant portion of 
Egyptian citizens living abroad would not be encouraged to take part in e-voting. 
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Entire categories of citizens residing abroad, such as the elderly and the 
technologically illiterate, would inevitably be discouraged from exercising their right 
to vote if such a voting method were employed.  
 The security aspect of remote e-voting is a critical issue which experts from all 
over the world are still trying to handle. This aspect obliged most countries to resort to 
traditional voting rather than e-voting despite the latter system’s apparent advantages. 
 According to available data about the previous Egyptian parliamentary 
elections, there is a need not only to raise the turnout rates among overseas citizens 
but also to increase the number of registered voters. At best, the number of registered 
Egyptian voters in the OCV for the parliamentary elections was only 13.6 percent of 
Egyptians living abroad. 
 Cross-country comparative data analysis about turnout rates in OCV indicates 
that the only determinant that can be directly associated with turnout among those 
studied is the type of voting method implemented. It has been shown that postal 
voting yields the highest turnout rates. It can be anticipated based on the experiences 
of several countries that turnout rates in OCV could gradually decrease when the 
novelty of the system wears off. 
 The efforts to identify determinants of turnout other than the voting method 
used were not successful. Other factors should be examined in future studies. For 
example, turnout could be influenced by specific conditions or incidences that take 
place inside or outside the country on election day/s, although these might be hard to 
examine statistically. Such conditions could for example include having a close 
election race or certain conditions in the host countries.  
 One of the major problems identified in the OCV process implemented for the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections was the limited time allocated to voters and 
administrators to be informed about and conclude every stage of the process.  
 Additionally, the fact that decisions concerning the registration and voting 
processes were always taken a very short time before the actual processes were due to 
start caused considerable confusion. This suggests a need to allow more time and 
support for training prior to the election dates to prepare both administrators and 
voters for the process.  
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the interviews carried out with administrators and voters and the relevant 
literature reviewed, suggestions for modifications in the current OCV process 
designed and implemented include: 
i. Providing appropriate training by professionals to diplomats about the 
Egyptian electoral process designed for out-of-country voting in addition to 
the general administrative and legal aspects related to elections in general. 
This could be a basic part of their training before they start their work in a new 
embassy or consulate, but should also be updated close to the election. 
ii. Detailed manuals tackling the process of out-of-country voting should be 
prepared and provided to embassies long before the actual process begins and 
any modifications should be promptly propagated to embassies. 
iii. A more effective means of communication has to be established between the 
SJCE and Egyptian citizens abroad through which the committee can inform 
citizens about updates related specifically to them through e-mails, such as 
information regarding their specific electoral district or the election dates for 
their phase. This would help in quickly and consistently handling problems 
arising during the process across embassies.  
iv. Elongating the period of time specified for receiving the envelopes in 
embassies to allow citizens to use ordinary postal services to send their votes 
instead of having to spend more money on express postal services. 
v. Expanding the period of time specified for online registration to avoid 
congestion on the website and to allow ample time for citizens to seek help 
regarding the registration process. 
vi. Although postal voting is the most suitable system to be used, one of its major 
drawbacks is the cost born by the voter to mail the vote back to the diplomatic 
mission, especially if it has to be done by express mail. To overcome this 
problem, a system can be devised whereby ballots can be sent to diplomatic 
missions at no cost for the voter in prepaid envelopes paid for by the Egyptian 
government. If such a system is not present in one of the countries, other 
means can be sought through negotiations with postal service companies in 
these countries to identify the best possible option. 
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vii. Proxy voting should be allowed as another option for OCV in future elections. 
In this case, a hybrid system containing postal and proxy voting would be 
allowed. Proxy voting would incur almost no additional administration costs, 
and at the same time could increase turnout rates. 
viii. The condition that only Egyptian citizens who have a valid national ID have 
the right to register for voting abroad should be eliminated. Such a condition 
significantly limits the numbers of citizens who are eligible to vote abroad, 
especially given that a large number of Egyptian expatriates have never been 
issued a national ID and have not visited Egypt for years. This can be replaced 
by using the Egyptian passport for registration. 
ix. The condition that voters have to submit copies of documents proving their 
residence in the country in which they chose to vote should also be eliminated. 
Allowing citizens on short visits to foreign countries to vote is likely to 
increase the number of registered voters and the turnout rates. 
x. All Egyptian diplomatic missions abroad should be involved in receiving 
mailed votes and citizens handing in their votes personally as a rule, not just 
the embassies. Although it was shown that such a step would not necessarily 
increase turnout, it would make the job of embassy staff much easier, 
especially in countries in which large numbers of Egyptians live such as the 
United Stated, Australia and Canada. In the United States for example there 
are four Egyptian consulates general (Los Angeles, New York, Houston and 
Chicago), in addition to the embassy in Washington. Only the embassy in 
Washington was involved in the first phase of the elections. It is crucial that 
this be clear to all citizens right from the beginning of the elections and it 
should be applied to all phases since changing the rules from one phase to 
another in the previous elections caused considerable confusion to citizens.  
xi. A permanent Egyptian electoral committee should be formed to handle matters 
related to all Egyptian elections instead of the current case where ad hoc 
committees are formed for each election. Having a permanent committee 
would allow for sustaining accumulated knowledge and lessons learned about 
the election processes in-country and out-of-country.  
xii. Laws and regulations related to OCV should indicate the types of elections in 
which OCV will be allowed in the future. At the time of writing this research 
the Egyptian presidential election was due to start in a few days and it was 
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announced that OCV would be allowed. It is therefore clear that OCV would 
be allowed in the parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt. 
Nonetheless, it is still not clear whether or not referenda and sub-national 
elections will include OCV. 
xiii. It has been shown by this research that postal voting is the option more likely 
to lead to higher turnout rates in OCV, and e-voting is the cheapest voting 
method, while personal voting is the most secure option. 
xiv. It can also be concluded from the findings that e-voting and personal voting 
are not viable options to be implemented in the Egyptian context as explained 
before. Findings have also suggested that postal voting is the second cheapest 
method after e-voting. In terms of security, no predispositions have been 
identified about the four different voting types expect that personal voting is 
the most secure option, while e-voting is the most risky.  
xv. Finally, it is the conclusion of this research that postal voting is the most 
suitable option for the Egyptian elections, but modifications have to be 
implemented on the system that has already been devised and implemented in 
the previous parliamentary elections. 
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APPENDIX A –  TURNOUT RATE PER COUNTRY IN THE 
EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Country Registered Voters Actual Voters Turnout (%) 
Saudi Arabia 142655 87182 61.0 
Kuwait 73029 50718 69.4 
United Arab Emirates 36812 18248 49.6 
Qatar 21722 15390 71.0 
United Stated 20604 11524 56 
Canada 9236 5415 58.6  
Italy 8149 5576 68.4 
France 6568 4494 68.4 
Oman 6344 4150 65.4 
Australia 6066 789 13.0 
United Kingdom 4705 2372 50.4 
Bahrain 3563 2168 60.8 
Jordan 2272 1227 54.0 
Germany 2180 1043 47.8 
Greece 1702 910 53.5 
Netherlands 1535 611 40.0 
Sudan 889 384 43.2 
Switzerland 787 462 58.7 
Sweden 711 301 42.3 
Algeria 662 499 75.4 
Belgium 508 276 54.3 
Lebanon 508 280 55.1 
Afghanistan 423 317 75.0 
Cyprus 415 180 43.4 
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Ireland 361 210 58.1 
Japan 302 172 57.0 
South Africa 296 204 69.0 
Norway 295 52 17.6 
Malaysia 292 153 52.4 
Denmark 242 136 56.2 
China 229 156 68.1 
Yemen 228 139 61.0 
Spain 219 81 37.0 
New Zealand 192 53 27.6 
Morocco 191 62 32.5 
Hungary 184 76 41.3 
Nigeria 166 69 41.6 
Russia 151 61 40.4 
Turkey 131 78 59.5 
Ghana 120 97 80.8 
Tunisia 120 72 60.0 
Niger 117 36 30.7 
Finland 109 59 54.1 
Djibouti 107 102 95.3 
Senegal 102 96 94.1 
Chad 100 88 88.0 
India 91 31 34.0 
Kenya 89 68 76.4 
Czech Republic 88 58 66.0 
Zambia 87 69 79.3 
Malta 83 64 77.1 
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Romania 75 44 58.6 
Syria 74 55 74.3 
Brazil 73 21 28.7 
Azerbaijan 73 34 46.6 
Iraq 73 18 24.6 
Poland 71 37 52.1 
South Korea 69 27 39.1 
Pakistan 66 56 84.8 
Singapore 66 52 78.8 
Albania 62 27 43.5 
Kazakhstan 61 10 16.4 
Mexico 59 7 11.8 
Israel 59 35 59.3 
Cameroon 57 31 54.4 
Indonesia 54 22 40.7 
Argentina 52 1 2.0 
Tanzania 52 42 80.7 
Portugal 51 18 35.3 
Thailand 50 34 68.0 
Palestinian Territories 
(Ramallah) 
49 7 14.3 
Ukraine 49 31 63.3 
Uganda 46 35 76.0 
Congo 42 28 66.6 
Ethiopia 42 24 57.1 
Bangladesh 40 37 92.5 
Gabon 40 34 85.0 
Estonia 39 Zero Zero 
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Malawi 37 19 51.3 
Mali 36 33 91.6 
Mauritania 33 31 94.0 
Angola 28 17 60.7 
Bulgaria 28 22 78.6 
Croatia 27 3 11.1 
Zimbabwe 27 23 85.2 
Slovakia 26 23 88.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
25 16 64.0 
Somalia 24 Zero Zero 
Namibia 23 17 74 
Iran 22 16 72.7 
Benin 21 14 66.6 
Mozambique 21 20 95.2 
Philippines 21 10 47.6 
Rwanda 20 17 85.0 
APPENDIX A: SOURCE MFA 
